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CASE COMMENTS
TENDER OFFER MANIPULATION UNDER SECTION 14(e) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT-BEYOND SCHREIBER
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,
105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985)
In Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.I the United States Supreme
Court further restricted the scope of the federal securities laws by hold-
ing that "manipulative" acts under section 14(e) of the Williams Act2
require misrepresentation or nondisclosure.3
In December 1982, Burlington Northern, Inc. (Burlington) undertook
a hostile tender offer for El Paso Gas Co. (El Paso) to which a majority4
of the El Paso shareholders, including the plaintiff Barbara Schreiber,
subscribed. Burlington rescinded the initial tender offer, however, after
negotiating a friendly takeover agreement with El Paso management.5
Under the new agreement Burlington agreed to make a second tender
offer.6 The second tender offer was oversubscribed, requiring Burlington
to purchase shares from individual shareholders on a pro rata basis.7
The rescission of the first tender offer therefore caused an economic loss
to those shareholders who, like Schreiber, tendered during the first offer.'
1. 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). Section 14(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudu-
lent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or
request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or
in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation....
Id.
3. 105 S. Ct. at 2465.
4. Id. at 2460.
5. Id.
6. Id. Burlington also agreed to provide safeguards against a squeeze-out merger of minority
shareholders, to recognize "golden parachute" contracts between El Paso and four of its officers, and
to purchase over four million shares from El Paso. Id.
7. Id. Section 14(d)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982), requires
bidders to purchase tendered shares on a pro rata basis if shareholders offer to sell more shares than
the bidder desires to purchase.
8. 105 S. Ct. at 2460-61. Burlington offered to purchase 21 million shares at $24 a share. Id.
El Paso's shareholders, however, tendered more than 40 million shares. Each shareholder therefore
was able to sell only about one-half of the shares he tendered. Id. Schreiber claims she lost $24 for
each share returned to her because of the proration. Id.
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Schreiber sued Burlington, El Paso, and El Paso's directors, alleging
that the withdrawal of the first tender offer constituted a manipulative
act or practice in violation of section 14(e) of the Williams Act.9 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the complaint.' ° On appeal, the Supreme Court af-
firmed and held: "manipulative" acts under section 14(e) of the Williams
Act require misrepresentation or nondisclosure and do not include acts
that, although fully disclosed, "artificially" affect the price of the take-
over target's stock."
In response to the growing popularity of tender offers as a corporate
acquisition technique, Congress enacted the Williams Act in 1968.12
Congress was particularly concerned with the pressure created by tender
offers on shareholders to react quickly, often without adequate informa-
tion.' 3 The primary goal of the Williams Act is to assure full and fair
disclosure in connection with tender offers. "
In addition to extensive disclosure provisions' 5 and limited substantive
9. Id. at 2461.
10. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 731 F.2d 163 (3rd Cir. 1984), af'd, 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985).
11. 105 S. Ct. 2458, 2465 (1985).
12. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD.
NEWS (82 Stat.) 521.
13. See 111 CONG. REc. 28,258 (1965) (statement of Sen. Williams).
14. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2811, 2812 [hereinafter "HousE REPORT"]; see also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1, 31 (1977).
The Williams Act does not define "tender offer." The SEC has set forth eight factors to help
determine whether an acquisition is a tender offer: (1) active and widespread solicitation of public
shareholders; (2) solicitation for a substantial percentage of the stock; (3) offer to purchase at a
premium; (4) terms of offer are firm; (5) offer is contingent on the tender of a fixed percentage of
shares; (6) offer is limited in duration; (7) shareholders are subject to pressure to sell; and (8) public
announcements of a purchasing program precede or accompany rapid accumulation of stock. See
Branson Ltd. v. Edper Equities, Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
15. The Williams Act requires disclosure in two types of transactions: substantial stock acqui-
sitions and tender offers. First, a person acquiring 5% or more of a class of any equity security
registered under § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act must disclose certain information to the issuer
and the SEC pursuant to § 13(d) of the Williams Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-l(a) (1985). Schedule 13D requires the disclosure statement to contain the identity and
background of the person filing the statement, the person's current holdings in the issuer, the source
and amount of funds used for the acquisition, and most importantly, the person's purpose underlying
the substantial stock acquisition. Second, a person making a tender offer for a class of any registered
equity security must file a similar disclosure statement with the SEC prior to purchasing the shares,
pursuant to § 14(d) of the Williams Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3
(1985).
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safeguards,16 Congress armed the Williams Act with section 14(e), an
antifraud provision patterned after section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act and rule 1Ob-5. 7 Section 14(e) makes it unlawful to make a
material misrepresentation or to engage in "manipulative acts" in con-
nection with a tender offer. 8 Section 14(e), however, fails to define "ma-
nipulative acts," leaving that task to the courts. 19
Judicial interpretations of section 10(b) have significantly contributed
to the analysis of "manipulative acts" under section 14(e). In Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder,2° for example, the Supreme Court considered
whether an alleged negligent failure of an accounting firm to discover
irregular practices during an audit of an investment firm was actionable
under rule 10b-5. 2 Relying on the language of section 10(b), the Court
held that rule lOb-5 requires "scienter"-an intent to deceive, manipu-
late, or defraud-or, at least, something more than negligence.22 In par-
ticular, the Court maintained that manipulation connotes willful conduct
16. The Williams Act provides a period during which shareholders may rescind shares ten-
dered. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982). The Act also requires bidders to purchase stock on a pro rata
basis. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982). Finally, the Act compels bidders to apply retroactively varia-
tions of the original terms of the offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982). Because Congress included
substantive provisions, some commentators conclude that disclosure constitutes only one means to
protect target shareholders during a tender offer. See, eg., Note, Target Defensive Tactics as Manip-
ulative Under Section 14(e), 84 COLUM. L. REv. 228, 240-41 (1984).
17. The similarities among the language of § 14(e), § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 have led some courts
and commentators to conclude that Congress merely intended to apply § 10(b) to the tender offer
context. See, eg., Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1157
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Profusek, Tender Offer Manipulation: Tactics and Strategies After Marathon, 36
Sw. L.J. 975, 993 (1982). The House Report states that § 14(e) "affirms" the duty of tender offer
parties to fully disclose material information. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 2821.
One commentator urges nevertheless that § 14(e) encompasses a broader range of conduct than
§ 10(b) because Congress added "fraudulent" conduct to § 14(e), a form of conduct not specificially
mentioned in § 10(b). See Junewicz, The Appropriate Limits of Section 14(e) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 62 Tax. L. REv. 1171, 1174-75 (1984).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (reprinted at supra note 2).
19. Congress amended § 14(e) in 1970 to empower the SEC to "define, and prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent" fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices. Act of
Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567 § 5, 84 Stat. 1497-98. The SEC has not yet attempted to define
these terms.
20. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
21. Id. at 188-90.
22. Id. at 193. The Court maintained that the terms "deceptive," "contrivance," and "manipu-
lative" indicate an unmistakable intent to proscribe conduct more culpable than negligence. Id. at
197-99. Moreover, the Court held that § 10(b) limits the scope of rule lOb-5; therefore, rule lOb-5
must include an element of scienter. Id. at 200-01.
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designed to deceive investors by artificially affecting securities prices.23
In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,24 the Supreme Court once again
relied on the language of section 10(b), particularly the term "manipula-
tive," to deny a cause of action under rule lOb-5 to minority shareholders
dissatisfied with a short-form merger.25 In part IV of the Sante Fe deci-
sion, a majority of the Court also pointed to the purpose of full disclosure
and principles of federalism to define the scope of section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5. According to the Court, the "fundamental purpose" of the Ex-
change Act was to implement a "philosophy of full disclosure."26 Rule
lOb-5 therefore protects investors by ensuring full disclosure. The Ex-
change Act does not attempt to regulate the substantive fairness of a
transaction. Rather, state fiduciary law provides a remedy to sharehold-
ers for unfair treatment caused by corporate mismanagement.27 The
Court considered the substantive regulation of fundamental corporate re-
organizations, such as a short-form merger or a tender offer, to be
outside the sphere of federal law.28
Several courts specifically addressed the scope of manipulative acts
under section 14(e) of the Williams Act. The result was a sharp split of
authority among the circuits.
In Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,29 the United States Court of Ap-
23. The Court based its decision on the language of § 10(b), considering the term "manipula-
tive" particularly significant. Id. at 199.
24. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
25. Id. at 465-68. Plaintiffs claimed that because Santa Fe allegedly acted with the sole purpose
of eliminating minority shareholders and without prior notice to those shareholders, the merger
lacked a justifiable business purpose and thus violated rule lb-5. Id. at 468.
The Court stated that manipulation "refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched
orders, or rigged prices .... intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity."
Id. at 476. The Court maintained that this technical definition comports with the purpose of the
Exchange Act, Le. replacing the philosophy of caveat emptor with that of full disclosure. Id. at 476-
77. Moreover, the Court opined that a manipulative scheme usually requires nondisclosure. Id.
26. Id. at 477-78.
27. Id. at 478-79. The Court feared that finding a rule lOb-5 action for breach of fiduciary duty
"would overlap and quite possibly interfere with state corporate law." Id. at 479. Absent a clear
indication of congressional intent, the Court refused to federalize substantive corporate law. Id.
28. rd. at 478.
29. 669 F.2d 366, 374 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). The Marathon Oil
court was perhaps the first circuit court of appeals to address manipulation under § 14(e). Several
district courts previously found that a target's defensive measures violated § 14(e) if the target's
actions lacked a justifiable business purpose. See, e.g., Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933
(N.D. Ill. 1982); Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,863 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976).
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peals for the Sixth Circuit broadly defined manipulative conduct as any
conduct that artificially affects securities prices.30 The court argued that
a "lock-up" agreement 3I employed as a defensive takeover tactic created
an artificial price barrier on tender offer prices.32 The court also asserted
that lock-up arrangements contravene the purposes underlying section
14(e) by preventing bidders from competing equally with target manage-
ment.33 Accordingly, the court concluded that the lock-up agreement
constituted a "manipulative act" within the meaning of section 14(e).34
Marathon Oil made section 14(e) a formidable weapon in the hands of
shareholders against corporate management who employed defensive
tactics to defeat a potentially favorable tender offer.
Most courts considering the type of conduct within the prohibition of
section 14(e) criticized Marathon Oil as an unwarranted expansion of the
scope of section 14(e). 35  In Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp. ,36 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit argued that Con-
gress was primarily concerned with the procedural aspects of tender of-
fers. Marathon Oil, the court reasoned, went well beyond the policy of
full disclosure. 37 "Manipulative acts" under section 14(e) therefore en-
compass only certain disclosure violations such as misrepresentation or
30. 669 F.2d at 374. The court urged a flexible interpretation of "manipulative" because Con-
gress intended to reach "the full range of ingenious devices used to manipulate securities prices." Id.
(quoting Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477).
31. A "lock-up" agreement constitutes an arrangement between the target corporation and a
bidder that gives the bidder an advantage over other potential bidders. See A. FLEISCHER, TENDER
OFFERs: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 323 (1983). In this case, Marathon Oil arranged
a competing tender offer by U.S. Steel. As part of the agreement, U.S. Steel acquired an option,
exercisable only if its tender offer failed, to purchase Marathon Oil's interest in a highly lucrative oil
field, plus a stock option. 669 F.2d at 367-68. Any successful bidder other than U.S. Steel would
therefore receive a company of significantly less value because U.S. Steel would exercise its option to
buy the field. Moreover, exercise of the stock option would increase the number of outstanding
Marathon Oil shares, and increase the price that a successful tender offeror would have to pay to
gain full control. Thus, the option to U.S. Steel effectively precluded competing offers.
32. 669 F.2d at 375. The court concluded that lock-up options "not only artificially affect, but
for all practical purposes completely block, normal market activity and in fact could be construed as
expressly designed for that purpose." Id. at 374.
33. Id. at 376. Cf Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) (by requiring
bidders to disclose to target management, Congress "intended to do no more than give target man-
agement an opportunity to express and explain its position.").
34. 669 F.2d at 377.
35. See, eg., Feldbaum v. Avon Prods., Inc., 741 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1984); Data Probe Acquisi-
tion Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984); Buffalo
Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2nd Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983).
36. 717 F.2d 757, 760 (2nd Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983).
37. Id. at 760.
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nondisclosure. 8
In Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc. ,39 the Supreme Court consid-
ered the meaning of "manipulative acts or practices" in section 14(e) of
the Williams Act. The Court firmly rejected Marathon Oil, holding that
"manipulative" as used in section 14(e) requires misrepresentation or
nondisclosure.' As in Santa Fe and Ernst & Ernst, the Court relied
primarily on the statutory language, particularly the term "manipula-
tive" in section 14(e).4 1 The Court refused to attach a different meaning
to "manipulative" in section 14(e) than it had previously attached to the
same term in section 10(b).4' Therefore, section 14(e) does not regulate
the substantive fairness of tender offers.
The Court buttressed its holding by referring to the purpose and legis-
lative history of section 14(e).43 The Court could not find in the legisla-
tive history the "slightest suggestion that [section] 14(e) serves any
purpose other than disclosure."'  Section 14(e) therefore merely supple-
38. Id.
39. 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985) (Burger, C.J.) (7-0). Justices Powell and O'Connor took no part in
the consideration of the case.
40. Id. at 2465.
41. Id. at 2461-62. Schreiber argued that "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or prac-
tices" should encompass even fully disclosed acts that artificially affect the target's stock price. Id. at
2461. The Sixth Circuit in Mobil gave "manipulative" precisely the same interpretation. See supra
notes 29-34 and accompanying text. The Court criticized that interpretation as conflicting with the
normal meaning of "manipulative." 105 S. Ct. at 2461-62. Moreover, the Court criticized Schrei-
ber's interpretation inasmuch as it relied on a congressional purpose broader than full and accurate
disclosure. Id. at 2461.
42. Schreiber asserted that because § 14(e) prohibits "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative"
conduct, manipulative conduct need not involve fraud or deception. Id. The Court responded that
§ 10(b) similarly used the disjunctive. Id.
The Court found no suggestion that use of "manipulative" by Congress represented a departure
from § 14(e)'s and the Exchange Act's "facial and primary concern with disclosure." Id. at 2462-63.
Moreover, the Court noted that Congress grouped together the terms "fraudulent," "deceptive," and
"manipulative" and directed each to nondisclosure. Id. Therefore, the Court should give a related
rather than a different meaning to each word. The Court claimed to apply "a familiar principle of
statutory interpretation that words grouped in a list should be given related meaning." Id.
43. Id. at 2463-65.
44. Id. at 2464. The Court found no evidence that § 14(e) "serves any purpose other than
disclosure or that the term 'manipulative' should be read as an invitation to the courts to oversee the
substantive fairness of tender offers; the quality of any offer is a matter for the marketplace." Id.
The Coui-t reasoned that permitting judges to read into "manipulative" their own sense of what
constitutes "unfair" or "artificial" conduct would create uncertainty until after the tender offer
closed. The Court thought that such uncertainty would undercut Congress' intent to provide inves-
tors with full information. Id. at 2465. Moreover, the Court noted that Congress intended that the
bidder and target corporations address target shareholders directly. Id. The Court thus found that
judicial oversight of the fairness of tender offers contradicts Congress' emphasis on shareholder
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ments the disclosure provisions throughout the Williams Act.45
Finally, the Court affirmed the district court's finding that Burling-
ton's conduct was not manipulative.46 The Court emphasized that all
activity that might have affected the price of El Paso's shares was done
openly and with full disclosure.47
The Supreme Court's interpretation of "manipulative" represents a
reasoned limitation on the application of section 14(e). A broader inter-
pretation of "manipulative," allowing federal courts to determine sub-
stantive fairness or to develop federal fiduciary duties would conflict with
state fiduciary law. Case-by-case development of federal fiduciary law
would create substantial uncertainty in the acquisition market, stifling
legitimate offensive and defensive tactics.
The Supreme Court in Schreiber provided some certainty with respect
to the proper scope of section 14(e) by precisely defining the meaning of
"manipulative." The Court avoided the federalism issue, however, that
was discussed in part IV of Sante Fe. As a result, the Court leaves un-
resolved the proper roles of federal and state law in the regulation of
tender offers.
K. WB.
choice. Id. Therefore, the Court refused to read a single word so expansively in an otherwise disclo-
sure-oriented statute. Id.
45. Id. at 2646.
46. Id. at 2465.
47. Id.
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